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I. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The following is a list of parties to the proceeding:
1.

Rolando Avila, plaintiff;

2.

Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance,
defendant;

3.

Holy Cross Hospital Family Health and Emergency
Center, de fendant;

4.

Holy Cross Hospital, defendant;

5.

Robert Winn, M.D., defendant; and

6.

David J. Howe, M.D., defendant.
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IV. JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final Order by Judge Michael R.
Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State
of Utah entered on November 10, 1988 dismissing plaintifffs
Complaint for failure to comply with the appropriate Statute of
Limitations period §78-14-4 U.C.A. and §78-14-12(1) of the Utah
Health Care Medical Malpractice Act.

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to §78-2-2(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1988
supplement), as prescribed by Rule 3 of the Utah Supreme Court
Rules.
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on appeal are:
1.

Whether §78-14-12 precludes the prior filing of a

Complaint to comply with §78-14-4, a private right cause of
action, where the state fails to hold a prelitigation review
hearing at no fault of the plaintiff;
2.

Whether the defendants waived the defense of the

Statute of Limitations or are estopped from asserting the
defense, where an answer was filed not containing the defense and
where defendants stipulated that the time for the prelitigation
hearing as required by §78-14-12(3) be extended;

1

3.

Whether defendants' second Motion to Dismiss is

barred by the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel;
4.

Whether the "Utah Medical Malpractice Act," §§78-

14-1 et seq., is unconstitutional for vagueness where there is
conflicting and unclear procedures between §78-14-4 and §78-14-12
and plaintiff's right to due process is left at the mercy of the
state.
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative Utah Statutes provide as follows:
Section 78-14-4(1):
No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence . . .[Emphasis added. Portions
omitted].
Section 78-14-8:
No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives
the prospective defendant or his executor or successor,
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action. Such notice shall include a
general statement of the nature of the claim, the
persons involved, the date, time and place of the
occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific
allegations of misconduct on the part of the
prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged
injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in
letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons
2

authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail,
return receipt requested, in which case notice shall be
deemed to have been served on the date of mailing.
Such notice shall be served within the time allowed
for commencing a malpractice action against a health
care provider. If the notice is served less than
ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable
time period, the time for commencing the malpractice
action against the health care provider shall be
extended to 120 days from the date of service of
notice.
This section shall, for purpose of determining its
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the
limitation on the time for commencing any action, and
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or
after April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to
third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims
against a health care provider. [Emphasis added].
Section 78-14-12:
(1) The Department of Business Regulations shall
provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice
cases against health care providers as defined in
Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The
department shall establish procedures for prelitigation
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or
alleged failure to provide health care. The
proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation. Proceedings conducted under authority of
this section are confidential, privileged, and immune
from civil process.
(2) The party initiating the medical malpractice action
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review
with the Department of Business Regulations within 60
days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent
to commence action under Section 78-14-8. The request
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all
health care providers named in the notice and request.
3

(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel
review under this section tolls the applicable statute
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of
an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return
receipt requested. [Emphasis added].
Section 78-14-13:
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all
evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the
parties or witnesses who provided the evidence,
documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedingsThe hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred by
the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal rules
of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery
or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except
upon special order of the panel, and for good cause
shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except
upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreement
of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and
closed to the public. No party shall have the right to
cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be
followed. The panel may, however, request special or
supplemental participation of some or all parties in
particular respects. Communications between the panel
and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on
the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other
parties.
(3) The Department of Business Regulation shall
appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the
matter for panel review as soon as practicable after
receipt of a request.
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in
proceedings before a panel. [Emphasis added].
4

Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Third

District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, Judge
Michael R. Murphy, which granted defendants1 second Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

Defendants' Motions were based

upon the assertion that even though plaintiff timely filed a
Complaint under §78-14-4(1) which was not dismissed by the first
Motion to Dismiss, but instead tolled, plaintiff failed to comply
with §78-14-12 of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act by not filing
a second Complaint because §78-14-12(1) states in part that: "* *
* Prelitigation review proceedings are informal and nonbinding,
but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commence
litigation."
Defendants' Second Motions to Dismiss were granted
(even though the Complaint was filed and the statute of
limitations was then tolled under Court order on defendants'
First Motions to Dismiss) apparently because the Department of
Business Regulations had not conducted a hearing, and yet after
the hearing was finally held, the Court concluded a new complaint
5

should have been filed within 60 days thereafter, and since

a

new complaint was not so filed, plaintiff's old complaint was
dismissed.

The Court found that the complaint was filed before

the hearing was held and that the "Statute of Limitations had
run" after the hearing was finally held, barring the plaintiff
from filing a new complaint.1

(See Minute Entry attached as

Exhibit "H" ).
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff was involved in a skiing accident,

dislocating his right lower leg, on February 1, 1984. On or
about January 31, 1986, plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Intent
to Commence Malpractice Action and filed a request with the
Department of Business Regulations for a prelitigation panel
review on March 4, 1986 within 60 days of the Notice of Intent.
Due to scheduling problems, the Department of Business
Regulations could not hold a timely prelitigation review panel.
On or about May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Complaint
in the Third District Court for Summit County, State of Utah.

On

or about June 19, 1986, defendant David Howe, M.D. filed an
Answer to plaintiff's Complaint.
1

On June 30, 1986, the parties

Counsel for appellant apologize to this court should the
foregoing paragraph appear awkward and confusing. The events
underlying this paragraph are awkward and confusing.
6

entered into a Stipulation extending the time for the hearing, A
partial prelitigation review hearing was finally held on December
2, 1986.

On or about November 4 and 7, 1987, defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply
with the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, §78-14-12, U.C.A, 1953 as
amended.
On March 7, 1988, based partially on stipulation of
counsel and the pleadings, District Court Judge Pat Brian denied
defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, sent the
case back for a full prelitigation panel review, and tolled the
proceedings pending a full prelitigation review, in order to meet
the requirements of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act.

On July 6,

1988, a second prelitigation panel review was held and an opinion
was issued on July 12, 1988.

In the latter part of September,

1988, defendants again filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint for failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice
Act.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Continuance to obtain

counsel.

The hearing was held on October 17, 1988, Plaintiff's

Motion to Continue was denied and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
were granted.

7

C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT
The issues involved in this appeal were properly dealt

with by the Court on defendants' first Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint.

District Court Judge Pat Brian denied

defendants' Motion to Dismiss, requested that a full
prelitigation panel review hearing be held, and in mind of the
legislative intent requiring a prelitigation review in medical
malpractice actions before litigation may commence, the Court
tolled any litigation proceedings pending a full prelitigation
review.

The Court did not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, but

further ordered that subsequent to the decision rendered by the
panel, the Court would entertain relevant dispositive motions.
On defendants' second Motion to Dismiss defendants again argued
that plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice
Act by filing a Complaint before a prelitigation review hearing
could be held.

Defendants further argued that plaintiff's

Complaint should be dismissed for failure to prosecute because
the Complaint had been filed in May, 1986 and it was now October,
1988.

Judge Murphy, apparently disregarding the Court's previous

ruling denying defendants' Motions and tolling the proceedings,
granted defendants' second Motion to Dismiss for failure to
comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice Act.

8

The Court also

barred any refiling of the Complaint because the Statute of
Limitations had run.
D.

RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Plaintiff and appellant, Rolando Avila (Avila) fell

skiing, which caused the dislocation of his right knee.

This

occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1, 1984 at Park
City, Utah.

Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski

Team prior to the accident, and was in Park City, Utah training
for the 1988 winter Olympic Games and other world-class ski
events.

(See Complaint Exhibit "D", page 3 ) .
2.

Mr. Avila was taken off the mountain and placed in

the care of Holy Cross Hospital, specifically Holy Cross
Ambulance Service, and was transferred to Dr. Wynn, a
pediatrician at the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City, Utah.

It is

alleged that Dr. Wynn was negligent in his attempt to put the
knee "back into place" and the right popliteal artery was
severed.

Dr. Winn claims he was acting under verbal instructions

of Dr. Howe at Holy Cross Hospital.

This occurred at

approximately 4:00 p.m. on February 1, 1984.

(See Complaint,

Exhibit "D", p. 4 ) .
3.

Mr. Avila was then transferred to Holy Cross

Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.

9

Upon arrival he was examined

by Dr. David Howe and was quickly taken to surgery.

Mr. Avila

underwent a femoral popliteal artery bypass grafting, using the
autogenous saphenous vein from his left leg.

During surgery, a

sterile environment was not maintained and inadequate wound care
was given by the staff of Holy Cross Hospital resulting in
infection, postponement of necessary surgery and additional
surgery due to the condition of Avila f s leg.

(Complaint, Exhibit

"D", pps. 5-6).
4.

As a result of Mr. Avila f s loss of his popliteal

artery and subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of
his right leg and has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot ski
or participate in active sports again due to the risk.
5.

On January 31, 1986, within two years of the injury

on February 1, 1984 as required by the Statute of Limitations,
U.C.A. §78-14-4(1), Mr. Avila timely filed a Notice of Intent to
Commence Action, which was sent to all parties by certified mail,
return receipt requested, pursuant to §78-14-8, U.C.A. (1953 as
amended) (Exhibit " A " ) , extending the time to file a Complaint
from February 1, 1986 to May 31, 1986 as provided by §78-14-8,
U.C.A. (1953 as amended).
6.

On March 4, 1986, Avila requested a hearing before

a prelitigation review panel.

This was requested within 60 days

10

of the filing of the Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant
to §78-14-12, U.C.A. (1953 as amended). (Exhibit " A " ) .
7.

Even though the Department of Business Regulations

had not scheduled the hearing, in order to comply with the 120
day extension period of the Statute of Limitations provided in
§17-14-8, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), Avila filed his Complaint on
May 23, 1986. (Exhibit " D " ) .
8.

On or about June 19, 1986, defendant David Howe,

M.D. filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.

The Answer did

not contain any affirmative defenses relating to the Statute of
Limitations or the failure of any condition precedent to
plaintiff's Complaint.
9.

(Exhibit "E" ).

Due to further scheduling problems, the Department

of Business Regulations still had not held a timely prelitigation
review hearing.

Dr. Howe filed an Answer to plaintiff's

Complaint on June 20, 1986, which did not contain any affirmative
defense relating to the Statute of Limitations.

(Exhibit "E").

All defendants entered an appearance by written Stipulation dated
June 30, 1986.

The Stipulation extended the time for hearing by

the prelitigation review panel as required by §78-14-13(3),
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) for successive 30 day periods until such
time as the Department of Business Regulations could schedule the

11

hearing. (Exhibit " C " ) .

No objection to the Statute of

Limitations was made.
10.

A prelitigation review hearing was not held until

December 2, 1986.
11.

(Exhibit " F " ) .

Notwithstanding defendants' Answers and

Stipulation, one year later in November, 1987, defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply
with Utah's Medical Malpractice Act, specifically the two year
Statute of Limitations provided in §78-14-4 and §78-14-12, U.C.A.
(1953 as amended). (Exhibits "G" and " H " ) .
12.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on regularly

for hearing on March 7, 1988 before Third District Court Judge
Pat Brian.

The Court recognized the fact that plaintiff had

filed his Complaint before a complete prelitigation review
hearing was held and that the review conducted on December 2,
1986 was not a complete review.

To carry out the legislative

intent behind the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, Judge Brian did
not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, but rather tolled any
proceedings relevant to the action pending full prelitigation
review.

The Court went on to state that it would entertain

relevant dispositive motions subsequent to the decision rendered
by the review panel.

(See Order of Judge Brian attached as

Exhibit " I " ) .
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13.

On July 6, 1988, a second prelitigation panel

review was held and an opinion was rendered on July 12, 1988.
(Exhibit " J " ) .
14.

On or about August 24, 1988, plaintiffs counsel,

George M. Haley, withdrew from the case leaving plaintiff without
counsel.

(Exhibit "L")*
15.

In the latter part of September, defendants again

filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to
prosecute and failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice
Act Statute of Limitations requirement, this time arguing that a
new Complaint should have been filed within 60 days of July 12,
1988, even though action on the Complaint as filed had been
tolled.

(Exhibit " K " ) .
16.

A hearing was held on October 17, 1988 before

Judge Michael Murphy of the Third District Court.

This time the

Court granted defendants1 Motion to Dismiss because a new
Complaint had not been filed..
Exhibit " H " ) .

(See Minute Entry attached as

The Order was entered on November 10, 1988.
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Avila has complied with the applicable Statute of
Limitations by filing his Complaint within the 120 days after the
Notice of Intent to Commence an Action, which was filed within
13

the two year period required, under U.C.A. §78-14-4(1).

The

Court cannot dismiss Avila f s Complaint for failure to comply with
the Statute of Limitations.
Avila has done everything in his power to comply with
the Utah Medical Malpractice

Act, U.C.A. §78-14-1 et seq., while

still remaining within the applicable Statute of Limitations
period.

There is no question that Avila complied with the

requirement of U.C.A. §78-14-8 and U.C.A. §78-14-12(2).
Avila ? s cause of action arose on February 1, 1984.

The

Complaint was filed on May 23, 1986, within 120 days of the
timely filing of his Notice of Intent to Commence a Malpractice
Action in accordance with U.C.A. §78-14-8.

The delay in

scheduling the prelitigation review hearing was not the fault of
Avila.

The defendants answered the Complaint and later entered

into a Stipulation extending the time period for the
prelitigation hearing.

The District Court realizing this,

properly dealt with defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint at the first hearing by not dismissing the timely filed
Complaint, but by tolling any relevant proceedings pending a full
and complete prelitigation review.

This complete prelitigation

review was not held until July 12, 1988.

Defendants waited for

the 60 day limitation period following an opinion to expire-knowing that plaintiff would not file a new Complaint as there
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had already been a hearing on this before the Court and his first
Complaint had not been dismissed by the Court—then filed a
second Motion to Dismiss arguing the same reasons as before, that
is, that plaintiff's Complaint violated §78-14-4 and §78-14-12.
At the hearing, defendants also argued plaintiff's failure to
prosecute the case (transcript, October 11, 1988, pg. 3 ) ,
however, defendants failed to point out to the Court that the
Court previously tolled all relevant proceedings pending a
complete prelitigation review hearing, which was not held until
July 12, 1988.
Based upon the vagueness of the Utah Medical
Malpractice Act and the Court's two rulings, it would be
impossible for the plaintiff to comply with both the Statute of
Limitations period in §78-14-4 and with the Utah Medical
Malpractice Act, §78-14-12.

The Court's first ruling did not

dismiss the Complaint, and tolled litigation to conform with §7814-12, but the Court's second ruling, made after the limitation
period had expired so plaintiff could not refile, dismissed
plaintiff's Complaint to comply with §78-14-12.
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IX. ARGUMENT
A.

PLAINTIFFTS COMPLAINT WAS FILED WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATION PERIOD.
Plaintiff's claim arose on February 1, 1984.

Within 2

years on January 31, 1986, in accordance with the applicable
Statute of Limitations, U.C.A. §78-14-4(1), Avila filed a Notice
of Intent to Commence an Action under U.C.A. §78-14-8.
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on May 23, 1986 within the 120
day extension provision of §78-14-8.

Therefore, plaintiff's

Complaint was filed within the applicable Statute of Limitations
period.

Furthermore, a timely request for prelitigation review

was filed by the plaintiff, which tolls the Statute of
Limitations until 60 days following the issuance of an opinion by
the prelitigation panel.

§78-14-12(3).

The 120 day extension

was to expire, however, before the issuance of an opinion, and
plaintiff, wanting to ensure compliance with the Statute of
Limitations, filed his Complaint within the 120 day period.

The

District Court cannot dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failing
to comply with the Statute of Limitations.
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B.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE
ACT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED.
The Utah Medical Malpractice Act (UMMA), Utah Code

Annotated §78-14-1 et seq, (1986) was followed by the plaintiff
both to the letter and spirit of the law.

U.C.A. §78-14-4

establishes a statute of limitations on medical malpractice
actions at two years from the date the cause of action arises or
is discovered.

The plaintiff in this action was injured and thus

his cause of action arose on February 1, 1984.

On January 31,

1986, within the two year Statute of Limitations, a Notice of
Intent to Commence Action was filed and mailed to the parties
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-14-8. (Exhibit " A " ) .

Because the Notice

of Intent to Commence Action was filed less than ninety days
prior to the expiration of the two year Statute of Limitations,
the time was extended to 120 days from the date the Notice was
served.

§78-14-8.
On March 4, 1986, pursuant to U.C.A. §78-14-12(2), the

plaintiff filed with the Department of Business Regulations a
Request For Prelitigation Panel Review.

(Exhibit " B " ) .

The

filing of the Request tolled the applicable Statute of
Limitations for a period of 60 days following an issuance of an
opinion by the review panel.

§78-14-12(3).
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It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff would not be
required to file a Complaint until 60 days after the opinion of
the review panel•

However, the Department of Business

Regulations was having difficulty convening a prelitigation
review panel and thus the 120 day limitation period was going to
expire before the issuance of an opinion.

The delay in the

review hearing was due to no fault of the plaintiff.

The

plaintiff, therefore, felt it prudent to file a Complaint within
the 120 day period, although prior to the time scheduled for the
prelitigation review, to avoid any possible defense based upon
the running of the statute of limitations.2
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on May 23, 1986.

In June

it became apparent to the parties that the Department of Business
Regulations could not conduct a timely review hearing after
receiving plaintiff's Request and the parties entered into a
Stipulation extending the time for successive 30 day periods
until a hearing could be held.

(Exhibit " C " ) .

A hearing was

held in December, 1986, and defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint in May, 1986, clearly before the
prelitigation hearing arguing that plaintiff had commenced
2

It is ironic to note that by filing within the 120
limitation period to avoid the Statute of Limitations,
plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed and he is now out of court
due to his alleged failure to comply with the Statute of
Limitations. (See Minute Entry of Judge Murphy, Exhibit " H " ) .
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litigation before the hearing in violation of §78-14-12 which
provides that such proceedings "are informal and unbinding, but
are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation."

The Trial Court denied defendants' Motion,

realizing the delay was on behalf of the Department of Business
Regulations and in order to comply with §78-14-12(1) the Court
tolled any litigation pending a complete prelitigation hearing
yet to be held.

But it is important to note that the Court did

not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint.

The Court Order has been

complied with by the plaintiff, there has been no litigation
prior to July 12, 1988, when a complete hearing was finally held
within two months defendants filed the same Motions to Dismiss.
The purpose of the UMMA has been satisfied in this case.
C.

THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT LOSE HIS RIGHT TO BRING THE
INSTANT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DUE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE DELAYS OF THE STATE.
As clearly set forth in the facts above, the delay in

the commencement of this action was not the fault of the
plaintiff.

The intent of UMMA was frustrated due to the failure

of the Department of Business Regulations to hold a timely
prelitigation review panel.

Because of the delay, plaintiff

could not have complied with both §78-14-12 of the Act and the
Statute of Limitations §78-14-4.
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Plaintiff either had to allow the 120 day limitation
period to expire and be barred by the Statute of Limitations or
plaintiff had to file a Complaint prior to the prelitigation
review hearing.

Plaintiff chose to file the Complaint•

This

decision was based upon an intention to be overly cautious and
provide ample notice and opportunity for the defendants to
respond as opposed to running the risk of losing a cause of
action based upon the running of the Statute of Limitations.
The situation the plaintiff found himself in was not
one anticipated by the Utah State Legislature.

The State's

administrative delays resulted in the expiration of the Statute
of Limitations before a prelitigation review panel could be held.
Due to the delay by the Department of Business Regulations the
Court should not have dismissed plaintiff's Complaint.

Failure

to meet a statutory condition precedent does not require a
dismissal, Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979),
citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).

The cases

cited by defendants in support of their Motions to Dismiss are
not on point in this case.

Each one deals with plaintiffs having

failed to provide notice or a timely request.
plaintiff was at fault.

In each case the

In the instant action, plaintiff did all

that was feasibly possible to comply with the statutory
requirements.

It is manifestly unjust for the Court to dismiss
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plaintiff's Complaint due to the delay on the part of the
Department of Business Regulations.
D.

BY ANSWERING PLAINTIFFfS COMPLAINT AND BY ENTERING AN
APPEARANCE THROUGH STIPULATING THAT THE TIME FOR THE
PRELITIGATION HEARING MAY BE EXTENDED, THE DEFENDANTS
WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR ARE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH DEFENSE.
The defendants waived their claims by their course of

dealing.

Dr. Howe answered the Complaint on June 19, 1986 with

no affirmative defense relating to the Statute of Limitations or
the failure of a condition precedent to filing the Complaint.
The Statute of Limitations defense must be plead as an
affirmative defense in a responsive pleading or it is waived.
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Insurance Company,, 664 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1983).
On June 30, 1986, all of the parties subsequent to the
filing of the Complaint, entered into a Stipulation which
provided that the time for the state to hold the hearing as
required under §78-14-13(3) be extended indefinitely for
successive 30 day periods.

The Statute of Limitations are not

jurisdictional and can be waived.
Sandstorm, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).

American Coal Company v.
The parties may also waive

statutory remedies or procedural defects.

Lindon City v.

Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981); Moss
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Theaters, Inc. v. Turner, 616 P.2d 1127 (N.M. App. 1980); Bigill
v. Luster, 672 P.2d 570 (Idaho App. 1983) cert, denied, appeal
dismissed 467 U.S. 1247, 104 S.Ct. 3527, 82 L.Ed.2d 834.

To

constitute a "waiver", one's actions must be distinctively made
and must show in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive.
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983).

Defendant Howe

answered the Complaint, waiving the affirmative defense of the
Statute of Limitations and all parties signed a Stipulation filed
with the Court after the filing of plaintiff's Complaint
intentionally tolling the Statute of Limitations and extending
the period in which the State could hold a hearing pursuant to
§78-14-13(3).

Such acts constitute a waiver of these claims by

the defendants.
The elements of equitable estoppel are, conduct by one
party which leads another in reliance thereon to adopt a course
of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is
permitted to repudiate his conduct.

Blackhurst v. Transamerica

Insurance Company, 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); United American Life
Insurance Company v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158
(Utah 1982); Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980).

The

course of dealing with defendants raises an estoppel against the
claims of the defendants.
1981).

Dixon v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83 (Utah

The plaintiff in good faith relied upon the acts of the
22

defendants.

The purpose of estoppel is to prevent injury arising

from the actions of the defendants which are relied upon in good
faith.

Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, 684

P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984); Larson v. Wycoff Company, 624 P.2d 1151
(Utah 1981); Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff relied upon the acts of the defendant, the Answer
and Stipulation of the parties and it would be detrimental to the
plaintiff to allow the defendants to repudiate their conduct.
See Arrowhead Construction Company of Dodge City, Kansas, Inc. v.
Essex Corporation, 662 P.2d 1195 (Kan. 1983) where the insurers
were estopped from changing their admission where individuals
relied upon the Stipulation and in the process gave up their
statutory remedy of lien foreclosure.
E.

IF THE FILING OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BEFORE A REVIEW
HEARING IS CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF §78-14-12(1) THE
MALPRACTICE ACT, SUCH ACT IS VAGUE AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act

provides that "no malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers . . . "

The Act also

requires a prelitigation review panel be held before an action
can be commenced.
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Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-12(1) provides: "The
proceedings are informal and unbinding, but are compulsory as a
condition precedent to commencing litigation."
Constitutional provisions provide that every man shall
have a remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation.

Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203

(Or. 1971); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).

A statute

must allow a sufficient period of time to enable plaintiff to
maintain his cause of action.
P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).

Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530

If §78-14-12(1) is interpreted to mean

that a person is unable to file suit until after the necessary
proceedings by the Department of Business Regulations have been
complied with, the state could then continually delay as in this
case and the Statute of Limitations under §78-14-4 would work as
a bar to the remedy before its accrual, making the statute
unconstitutional.
1979).

City of Norman v. Liddell, 596 P.2d 879 (Okl.

If plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed plaintiff will have

been denied an opportunity to seek relief for his injuries by
being barred by the Statute of Limitations before the accrual of
his claim on July 12, 1988.
The statute states that the proceedings are a condition
precedent and that the Department of Business Regulations shall
provide a hearing panel.

§78-14-12 U.C.A. (1953 as amended).
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The proceedings under §78-14-12 were held to the extent possible
by the plaintiff as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation.

The timely filing of a Notice to Commence an Action

and Request for a panel review was a proceeding sufficient for
the plaintiff to meet the requirements of §78-14-12.
The statute states that the state "shall" provide a
hearing.

A hearing therefore must be provided.

There is no

statement of what happens if the state fails to provide such a
hearing.

To simply refuse the plaintiff a private cause of

action due to the state's failure to follow the statute is
manifestly unjust and unconstitutional, in effect depriving the
plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities by the
constitution under color of state law.
F.

THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS ON MARCH 7, 1988, RAISES A BAR OF RES JUDICATA
OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO THE ARGUMENTS IN DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
On or about May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Complaint

in the instant action.

On December 2, 1986, due to the delays of

the State, a prelitigation review hearing was held.

On or about

November 4 and 7, 1987, defendants filed Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with the UMMA, §7814-12.

(Exhibit "G" ).
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On March 7, 1988, District Court Judge Pat Brian denied
defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and sent the
case back for a full prelitigation panel review and tolled the
proceedings pending a full prelitigation review to fulfill the
requirements of §78-14-12(1)•
Brian).

(Exhibit "I", Order of Judge

Plaintiff's Complaint was not dismissed by the Court,

but rather the Court tolled any further proceedings,3
On July 6, 1988, a second prelitigation panel review
was held and an opinion was issued on July 12, 1988.
"J").

(Exhibit

The defendants waited 60 days, then filed a second Motion

to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with UMMA,
§78-14-12. (Exhibit " K " ) . 4

The second time, District Court Judge

Michael R. Murphy granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
dismissed plaintiff's Complaint.

The plaintiff relied on the

Court's prior decision in not dismissing his Complaint, but
tolling the proceedings.

The Court's second decision on the same

3

At this time, it must have been evident to the Court that
plaintiff filed before the necessary review panel could be held
as the Court requested a more complete hearing be held. The
Court at this time could have also dismissed plaintiff's
Complaint for failing to meet the statutory requirements of the
UMMA and perhaps should have; however, realizing plaintiff's
predicament the Court did not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint but
rather tolled the commencement of any litigation specifically
with §78-14-12 in mind.
4

Defendants purposely waited 60 days so the limitation
period would expire knowing that plaintiff would not file a new
Complaint based upon the prior court hearing.
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issues has put the plaintiff at a great disadvantage and is
unjust.

If Judge Brian would have dismissed plaintiff's

Complaint at the prior hearing, a new Complaint would have been
filed.

Now after relying on Judge Brian's Order, Judge Murphy

has ruled that the Complaint should have been dismissed, but not
until more than two years later, after the expiration of the
Statute of Limitations.

To prevent such catastrophic results,

the law has adopted two principles, res judicata and collateral
estoppel, and the policy of "law of the case", which provide
respect and finality to a Court's decision.
The doctrine of res judicata renders the final judgment
on the merits conclusive upon the parties and is a bar to
subsequent litigation of the same issues.
629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981).

Bernard v. Attebury,

Collateral estoppel, or issue

preclusion, prevents re-litigation of issues that have been once
litigation and determined in another action even though the
claims for relief may be different.
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,

The law of the case is similar to res

judicata but more limited in that the law of the case applies to
final decisions affecting the same parties to the same case,
while res j_udicata forecloses parties or their privies.
v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo. App. 1982).
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Verzuh

Under res judicata, the claims of the defendants that
the Complaint should be dismissed for the second time for
violating §78-14-12 are barred.

The defendants were all parties

in the prior litigation on the same issues.
final judgment on the merits of the case.

Judge Brian made a

The fact that the

judgment may not be free from error does not preclude the res
judicata effect.

Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d

387 (Utah App. 1987).

On a second claim, it is essentially the

same as a prior claim which has gone to final judgment; res
judicata means that neither party can again litigate that claim.
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981);

Trimble Real

Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, since the issues raised on defendants'
second Motion are the same issues already dealt with by the
Court, collateral estoppel precludes the re-litigation of those
issues.

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., supra.
Moreover, since the same parties are involved, the law

of the case is also applicable.

Verzuh v. Rouse, supra.

The

moral of the law of the case is based upon the principle that
when an issue is once litigated and decided that it should be the
end of the matter.

Id.

The Court should not be allowed to

change a ruling whether it believes it to be erroneous or not, if
either side is prejudiced thereby.
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State Ex Rel. Harmon v.

Blanding, 644 P.2d 1082 (Or, 1982).

The plaintiff relied upon

the Court's prior ruling of not dismissing the Complaint but
simply tolling the litigation.

If the Court would have

previously dismissed the Complaint or if defendants would have
brought their Motion timely, plaintiff would have filed a new
Complaint after the second prelitigation hearing but within the
60 day limitation period.

It is improper for a judge presiding

at trial to grant a Motion which has been denied during prior
proceedings by a different judge.
738 (Utah 1985).

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d

See also Eliopulos v. Colorado State Personnel

Board, 705 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985) where the Court of
Appeals' denial of preliminary Motion to Dismiss Appeal was law
of the case precluding further consideration of the issue on the
merits of the appeal.

The plaintiff reasonably relied upon the

Court's previous order and defendants' Motion before Judge Murphy
are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel and the policy of law of the case.
G.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT CANNOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE IN OCTOBER, 1988, WHEN THERE IS A COURT
ORDER TOLLING ANY PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER PENDING A
COMPLETE PRELITIGATION REVIEW, WHICH WAS NOT HELD UNTIL
JULY 12, 1988.
Defendants' subsequent Motions to Dismiss were not only

based upon plaintiff's violation of §78-14-4 and §78-14-12 of the
UMMA, but upon Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. and claim that plaintiff's
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Complaint should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
(Exhibits "K" and "M , f ).

Counsel for defendant, Mr. Epperson,

argues that the Notice of Intent was filed in January, 1986 and
it was now October, 1988.
Exhibit " N " ) .

(Transcript, October 3, 1988, p. 4,

Mr. Epperson fails to point out to the Court its

previous Order tolling any litigation pending a complete review
hearing.
1988.

A complete review hearing was not held until July 12,

(Transcript pg. 8 ) . Plaintiff's own attorney withdrew on

August 24, 1988 (Exhibit "L"), then defendants filed their Motion
to Dismiss for failure to prosecute approximately two weeks after
this date, (Exhibit " K " ) .

In defendant's supportive Memorandum,

they argue that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence at the
prelitigation hearing (Exhibit " M " ) ; however, the hearing does
not go to the merits of the case.

§78-14-12.

The Court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint based upon
the findings and interpretation of Mr. Epperson as to what the
Stipulation meant and that a new lawsuit should have been filed
in December.

(Transcript pps. 14 and 15, Exhibit " 0 " ) .

Mr.

Epperson claims defendants would not have stopped plaintiff if he
would have filed in December.

(Transcript p. 15). Furthermore,

Mr. Epperson is asking the Court to rule upon facts that would
have happened according to defendant's counsel.

Plaintiff had to

rely on and comply with the Court's prior order, not on what
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defendants would have done.

Plaintiff could not have filed in

December anyway, as there wasn't a complete review hearing until
July of 1988.

Any further action in the case was tolled by Judge

Brian until July 12, 1988 when a complete hearing could be held.
(Exhibit " I " ) .

By filing in December, plaintiff would not have

only violated Judge Brian's Order, but he would have still been
in violation of §78-14-12 because such filing would have still
been before there was a complete review hearing.
X, CONCLUSION
Plaintiff complied with the Utah Medical Malpractice
Act and the applicable Statute of Limitations.

The requirements

of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act have been satisfied and
followed to the fullest extent possible by the plaintiff
considering the delays by the state administrative agency.
Plaintiff should not lose his right to bring suit due
to the delays of the state.

If plaintiff cannot file a Complaint

until after the administrative hearing, his remedy did not arise
until July 12, 1988, after the Statute of Limitations has
expired, making the Utah Medical Malpractice Act
unconstitutional.
The Court previously dealt with defendant's Motion on
March 7, 1988, before Judge Brian.
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Defendants were thus barred

by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case to
bring the same Motions a second time.

The Court's subsequent

inconsistent position works a great hardship on the plaintiff and
is unjust.
Judge Murphy's ruling should be reversed and plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed on his Complaint.
DATED this

^

day of May, 1989.
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA

By: T ^ - ^ ^ /V ^x^*<Charles C. Brown
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ROLANDO AVILA,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO
COMMENCE MALPRACTICE ACTION

vs.
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AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
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Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley,
of Haley St Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman St Hamilton, hereby serve notice to
Robert T. Wynn, M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency
Center (hereinafter "Holy Cross Clinic"), Holy Cross Hospital
Park City Ambulance (hereinafter "Holy Cross Ambulance"), Holy
Cross Hospital and David Howe, M.D., of Mr. Avila's intention to
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commence a medical malpractice action.
I.

NATURE OF CLAIM

Mr. Avila1s claim of malpractice arises out of the medical
treatment: Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his right lower
extremity in a skiing accident.

Mr. Avila fell while skiing and

hit a lift terminal, which caused the dislocation of his right
knee.

This occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1,

1984, where the Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect.

At the

location of the injury, he was examined by Dr. Roger Suchyta and
Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman Janet Stoltz. At the
time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a palpable dorsalis pedis
pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his foot was warm.

Based

upon the examination of the above-referenced individuals, the
extremity was immobilized by the placing of a splint; and
Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine.

Based upon the

findings of the above-referenced individuals, a decision was made
not to use the helicopter to transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City; rather, he was taken by
toboggan to the bottom of the mountain and placed in the care of
Holy Cross Hospital by and through their agents, Holy Cross
Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer; and the EMT technician,
Shoshnik.

While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the

splint and ski boot were removed, and a capillary fill test was
performed.

At that point, the capillary fill time of Mr. Avila1s

right big toe was within acceptable limits.
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Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it
is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all
individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City.

Pursuant to that

policy and practice of the Holy Cross Ambulance, Mr. Avila was
transported to the Holy Cross Clinic.

When Mr. Avila arrived, he

was examined by Dr. Wynn, who is a pediatrician who does not have
the requisite training and experience to handle complicated
orthopedic problems such as he was faced with in the present
circumstances.

Dr. Wynn did not refer the case to one of the

available orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Wynn
immediately transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had
the appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that
Mr. Avila was in.

Dr. Wynn attempted to put the knee "back into

place" by rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion.
During this episode, the right popliteal artery was avulsed.
Dr. Wynn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg back into
place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy Cross
Hospital in Salt Lake City.
The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984, at
approximately 4:00 p.m.
Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late
afternoon of February 1, 1984. Upon arrival, his lower extremity
was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable
dorsalis pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila1s
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foot was cold.

Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the

dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of
the popliteal artery was disclosed.

Mr. Avila underwent a

femoral popliteal bypass grafting, utilizing the autogenous
saphenous vein from his left leg.

During the surgery, a sterile

environment was not maintained by the staff of Holy Cross
Hospital.

Further, during the post-operative period, inadequate

wound care was given to Mr. Avila, resulting in an infection in
the inferior aspect of the medial incision on the right knee, as
well as in the left proximal thigh.

As a result of the

infection, the surgery to repair Avilafs anterior cruciate
ligament, sartorius tendon, medial gastroc, and semimembranosus
repair had to be postponed.

This had an adverse effect on the

rehabilitation of Mr. Avila.

Further, due to the condition of

the incisions on both legs, Mr. Avila underwent a surgery on
February 13, 1984, to remove necrosis of peri-incisional skin and
subcutaneous fat on the left thigh from the donor site.
As a result of Mr. Avila1s loss of his popliteal artery and
the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his right
lower extremity.

Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member

of the Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah,
training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class
ski races.

Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot

ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg.
By way of defense, Dr. Wynn claims that he had a
- 4 -

consultation over the phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe
directed Dr. Wynn to attempt to get the knee joint back into
place.
II.
A.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT

HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
1.

Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service.
(a) Mr. Avila alleges that it was misconduct on behalf

of the EMTfs, ambulance driver or technician to remove
Mr. Avila1s boot and splint in the ambulance.
(b) Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances where
there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk of
pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should be
splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified
orthopedic surgeon.
(c) Mr. Avila further alleges that it is misconduct on
the part ot Holy Cross Hospital to have a policy of transporting
patients with acute orthopedic problems to the Holy Cross Clinic
when there is not appropriate orthopedic staff on duty.
2.

Holy Cross Hospital Family Health Center.
(a)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Clinic

to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an acute orthopedic
problem, with a member of the staff who was a pediatrician and
not trained to treat severe orthopedic conditions such as
Mr. Avila1s.
(b)

It was misconduct on the part of the Clinic
- 5-

to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without having an
orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service.
1.

Holy Cross Hospital.
(a)

It was misconduct on the part of Holy Cross

Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in the
operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both
incision sites.
(b)

It was misconduct on the behalf of the staff of

Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the appropriate
post operative wound care, which enabled the infection to take
place.
(c)

It was misconduct by the staff of Holy Cross

Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and treat the
infection in Mr. Avila1s extremities when they were discovered by
the Hospital staff.
(d)

It was misconduct on behalf of the Hospital to

maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use their own
ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila, with
obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon.
(e)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital

not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the Park City Clinic if
they were going to attempt to deal with orthopedic problems.
(f)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital

not to train their staft members, such as Dr. Wynn, to refer
- 6 -

orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic surgeon in Park
City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately orthopedic
problems such as Mr. Avilafs to a hospital which could perform
orthopedic services.
B.

ROBERT WYNN, M.D.
1.

It was misconduct on the part of Dr. Wynn to attempt

treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously complicated orthopedic
problem, when Dr. Wynn was a pediatrician and not trained or
experienced in dealing with injuries such as he was faced with
with Mr. Avila.
2.

It was misconduct for Dr. Wynn not to refer Mr. Avila

immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alternatively,
immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility which
offered orthopedic services.
3.

It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to attempt to

put Mr. Avila's knee back into place at all and, specifically,
was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back into place by
rotating the lower portion of that extremity.
4.

It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to remove the

splint placed on the leg. As a result of Dr. Wynn's attempt to
rotate the lower leg and to put the same into place, the
popliteal artery was avulsed.
C.

DAVID J. HOWE, M.D.
Dr. Wynn alleges that he attempted to put the leg in place

pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by Dr. Howe
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over the telephone.

If this allegation is, in fact, correct, it

was misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to:
1.

give verbal directions on the telephone as to how to

get the leg in place without physically examining the same.
2.

put that treatment in the hands of a pediatrician who

was not trained and did not have the experience to place an
acutely dislocated knee back into place.
3.

fail to direct Dr. Wynn to refer Dr. Avila to an

orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alternatively, to
have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health care facility
which offered orthopedic services.
III.

AVILA1S INJURIES AND DAMAGES

Mr. Avilafs injuries are as follows:
1.

Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased risk

of loss of the limb due to the vein graft.
2.

Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right leg

due to probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Wynnfs
abortive attempt at relocating the knee.
3.

The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to the

vein grafting.
4.

The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a result

of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as subcutaneous
fat and other tissue.
5.

The decrease in function of both extremities due to the

vein graft and the nerve damage.
- 8 -

IV.

DAMAGES

In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was damaged
due to the actions of the above-referenced health care providers
in the following particulars:
1.

Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski

Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, as
well as other national and international meets, at the time of
the accident. As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career
is over.

Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee

had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have
been able to ski competitively.
2.
bypass.

Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein
Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg

again, he could lose his leg.
3.

The pain and suffering associated with undergoing the

two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984.
4.

Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in his

leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accompanying
effect on Mr. Avilafs lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer play
active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc.
5.

Pain and suffering associated with the infections and

recovery from the unnecessary surgery.
6.

The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due to
- 9-

the infection.
7.

Numbness in the legs and feet.

8.

Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter

Olympic Games. Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian
National Team for the 1988 Olympics.

By simply being a member of

the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero.

Mr. Avila had

the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top
levels of that competition.

Due to his injuries, he was deprived

of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc.
You are hereby directed to notify your attorney and/or
insurance carrier of this Notice of Intent to Commence
Malpractice Action in order to notify the Department of Business
Regulations to schedule a prelitigation medical malpractice
hearing panel.
DATED this 31st day of January, 1986.
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER

GEORGE (jk HALEY^'
Attorned for Rolando A\/ila
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EXHIBIT "B"
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W
TENTH FLOOR WALKER
173 S O U T H M A I N

CENTER

STREET

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8*111-1030

GEORQE M HALEY
ROQERT L. STOLEBARGER
J E F F R E Y W. APPEL

OF COUNSEL
FRANK E MOSS

T E L E P H O N E (SOI) 3 3 M 3 3 3

REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW
March 4, 1986
Gwen Rowley
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS - DOPL
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
RE:

Robert T. Winn, M.D.; Holy Cross Family
Health and Emergency Center; Holy Cross
Hospital Park City Ambulance; Holy Cross
Hospital; David Howe, M.D.

Dear Ms. Rowley:
Pursuant t o Utah Code A n n o t a t e d ^ 7 8 - 1 4 - 1 2 , p l e a s e be a d v i s e d
t h a t t h i s l e t t e r c o n s t i t u t e s a f o r m a l r e q u e s t on b e h a l f o f my
c l i e n t , Rolando A v i l a , f o r a p r e l i t i g a t i o n p a n e l r e v i e w o f
h i s intended medical m a l p r a c t i c e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Robert T. Winn,
M.D., Holy Cross Family H e a l t h and Emergency C e n t e r , Holy Cross
H o s p i t a l Park C i t y Ambulance, Holy C r o s s H o s p i t a l , and David
Howe, M.D. Per your r e q u e s t , I e n c l o s e h e r e w i t h f i v e c o p i e s o f
t h i s l e t t e r , together with s i x c o p i e s o t our N o t i c e o f Intent to
S u e , and p h o t o c o p i e s of our p r o o f s o f s e r v i c e t h e r e o f .
I look forward to h e a r i n g from y o u a t y o u r e a r l i e s t
c o n v e n i e n c e ; and i n the meantime, s h o u l d y o u r e q u i r e anything
f u r t h e r i n t h i s regard, p l e a s e g i v e me a c a l l .
Very t r u l y

yours,

HALEY & STOLEBARGER

: smw
Enclosures
cc All defendants

n

GEORGE M. HALEY
HALEY Sc ST0LE3ARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-1555
DAVID R. HAMILTON
MICHAEL G. BELNAP
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON
205 - 26th Street, //34
Ogder., Utah 8^.401
(801) 394-5526
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

S T I P U L A T I O N

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D. ;
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D. ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 8885

Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley, of
Haley & Stolebarger; defendants Holy Cross Hospital and related
entities, by and through their counsel, David W. Slagle, of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau; defendant David Howe, by and through his
counsel, William W. Barrett, of Kipp and Christian, P.C.; and

defendant Robert T. Winn, by and through his counsel, hereby
agree and stipulate that the time for hearing on the prelicigation review of the above-referenced case, as required by
578-14-13(3), may be extended for successive thirty-day periods
until such time as the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing can schedule the hearing.
DATED this g C ^ d a y

0f

1986.

C5VK]£

HALEY & ST0LE3ARGER
/

^j

GEORGE W. HALEY
/
Attorney for Plaintiff
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Attorney for DefendantsyHoly Cross
Hospital and relatedentities
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Attorney for Defendant Howe

DAVID H. EPPERSOf
Attorney for Defendant Winn

GEORGE M. HALEY
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Screec
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-1555

. y:*V

t^

DAVID R. HAMILTON
MICHAEL G. BELNAP
FARR, KAUFMAN Sc HAMILTON
205 - 26th Street, #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 394-5526

7S.

Attorneys for Rolando Avila
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

U U M r L A l N T

vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.;
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D.

C i v i l No.

SSSi"

Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley,
of Haley & Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman & Hamilton, complains and alleges
against the defendants as follows:
1.

Rolando Avila is a resident of Summit County, State of

Utah.

- 1 l \ | \

//

2.

Robert T. Winn, M.D., is a physician practicing

medicine in Summit County, State of Utah.
3after

Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center (herein-

,!

Holy Cross Clinic") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holy

Cross Hospital and a medical facility doing business in Summit
County, State of Utah.
4.

Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance (hereinafter

"Holy Cross Ambulance") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holy
Cross Hospital doing business in Summit County, State of Utah.
5.

Holy Cross Hospital is a medical facility doing

business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

David Howe, M.D., is a physician practicing medicine in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
7.

Plaintiffrs cause of action against defendants Winn,

Holy Cross Ambulance and Holy Cross Clinic arose in Summit
County, State of Utah,
8.

Plaintiff's cause of action against Dr. Howe and Holy

Cross Hospital arose in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
9.

Venue is proper in Summit County, State of Utah.

10.

The plaintiff has fully complied with the requirements

of U.C.A. $78-14-1, et seo., having filed a timely Notice of
Intent to Commence Malpractice Action upon the defendants and
having filed a request with the Department of Business
Regulations for a prelitigation screening panel.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
11.

Mr. Avilafs claim of malpractice arises out of the

medical treatment Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his
right lower leg in a skiing accident.
12.

On February 1, 1984, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the

plaintiff fell while skiing and hit a lift terminal where the
Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect.
13.

The plaintiff dislocated his right knee as a result of

the fall.
14.

At the location of the injury, he was examined by

Dr. Roger Suchyta and Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman
Janet Stoltz.

At the time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a

palpable dorsalis pedis pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his
foot was warm.
15.

Based upon the examination of the above-referenced

individuals, the extremity was immobilized by the placing of a
splint; and Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine.
16.

Based upon the findings of the above-referenced

individuals, a decision was made not to use the helicopter to
transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake
City; rather, he was taken by toboggan to the bottom of the
mountain and placed in the care of Holy Cross Hospital by and
through their agents, Holy Cross Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer;
and the EMT technician, Shoshnik.
17.

While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the
- 3 -

splint and ski boot were removed by the EMT's, and a capillary
fill test was performed.

At that point, the capillary fill time

of Mr. Avilafs right big toe was within acceptable limits.
18.

Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it

is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all
individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City.
19.

Pursuant to that policy and practice of the Holy Cross

Ambulance, Mr. Avila was transported to the Holy Cross Clinic.
20.

When Mr. Avila arrived, he was examined by Dr. Winn,

who is a pediatrician who does not have the requisite training
and experience to handle complicated orthopedic problems such as
he was faced with in the present circumstances.
21.

Dr. Winn did not refer the case to one of the available

orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Winn immediately
transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had the
appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that
Mr. Avila was in.
22.

Dr. Winn attempted to put the knee "back into placeM by

rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion.

During this

episode, the right popliteal artery was pinched and/or severed.
23.

Dr. Winn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg

back into place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City.
24.

The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984,
- 4 -

at approximately 4:00 p.m.
25.

Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late

afternoon of February 1, 1984. Upon arrival, his lower extremity
was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable
dorsalis pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila's
foot was cold.
26.

Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the

dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of
the popliteal artery was disclosed.
27.

Mr. Avila underwent a femoral popliteal bypass

grafting, utilizing the autogenous saphenous vein from his left
leg.

During the surgery, a sterile environment was not

maintained by the staff of Holy Cross Hospital.
28.

During the post-operative period, inadequate and

negligent wound care was given to Mr. Avila by the staff of Holy
Cross Hospital, resulting in an infection in the inferior aspect
of the medial incision on the right knee, as well as in the left
proximal thigh.
29.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

Holy Cross in causing the infection, the surgery to repair
Avilafs anterior cruciate ligament, sartorius tendon, medial
gastroc, and semimembranosus repair had to be postponed, which
had an adverse effect on the rehabilitation of Mr. Avila.
30.

Due to the condition of the incisions on both legs,

Mr. Avila underwent surgery on February 13, 1984, to remove
- 5 -

necrosis of peri-incisional skin and subcutaneous fat on the left
thigh.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants'

negligence in causing Mr. Avilafs loss of his popliteal artery
and the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his
right lower extremity.
32.

Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member of the

Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah, training for
the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class ski races.
33.

Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot

ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg.
34.

Dr. Winn claims that he had a consultation over the

phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe directed Dr. Winn to attempt
to get the knee joint back into place.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
35.

Plaintiff alleges that Holy Cross Hospital was negli-

gent and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care
in the following particulars:
(a) Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service.
(i)

Mr. Avila alleges that it was negligent

misconduct on behalf of the EMT's, ambulance driver or technician
to remove Mr. Avilafs boot and/or splint in the ambulance;
(ii)

Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances

where there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk
of pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should
- 6 -

be splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified
orthopedic surgeon; and
(iii) Mr. Avila further alleges that it is
negligent misconduct on the part of Holy Cross Hospital to have a
policy of transporting patients with acute orthopedic problems to
the Holy Cross Clinic when there is not appropriate orthopedic
staff on duty,
(b) Holv Cross Hospital Family Health Center.
(i)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of

Holy Cross Clinic to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an
acute orthopedic problem, with a member of the staff who was a
pediatrician and not trained to treat severe orthopedic
conditions such as Mr. Avila's; and
(ii)

It was negligent misconduct on the part of

the Clinic to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without
having an orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service; and
(iii) It was negligent misconduct to have Holy
Cross Ambulance transport orthopedic cases to the Center without
having the requisite orthopedic staff.
(c) Holy Cross Hospital.
(i)

It was negligent misconduct on the part of

Holy Cross Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in
the operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both
incision sites;
(ii)

It was negligent misconduct on the behalf of
- 7 -

the staff of Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the
appropriate post operative wound care, which enabled the
infection to take place;
(iii) It was negligent misconduct by the staff of
Holy Cross Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and
treat the infection in Mr. Avilafs extremities when they were
discovered by the Hospital staff;
(iv)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of the

Hospital to maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use
their own ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila,
with obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon;
(v)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of

Holy Cross Hospital not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the
Park City Clinic if they were going to attempt to deal with
orthopedic problems; and
(vi)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of

Holy Cross Hospital not to train their staff members, such as
Dr. Winn, to refer orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic
surgeon in Park City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately
orthopedic problems such as Mr. Avila1 s to a hospital which could
perform orthopedic services.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
36.

Plaintiff alleges that Robert Winn, M.D., was negligent

and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care in
- 8 -

the following particulars:
(a)

It was negligent misconduct on the part of

Dr. Winn to attempt to treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously
complicated orthopedic problem, when Dr. Winn was a pediatrician
and not trained or experienced in dealing with injuries such as
he was faced with with Mr. Avila;
(b) It was negligent misconduct for Dr. Winn not to
refer Mr. Avila immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alternatively, immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility
which offered orthopedic services;
(c)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of Dr. Winn

to attempt to put Mr. Avilafs knee back into place at all and,
specifically, it was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back
into place by rotating the lower portion of that extremity; and
(d)

It was negligent misconduct on behalf of Dr. Winn

to remove the splint placed on the leg.

As a result of

Dr. Winn's attempt to rotate the lower leg and to put the same
into place, the popliteal artery was either severed or pinched.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
37.

Plaintiff alleges that David J. Howe, M.D., was

negligent and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of
care in the following particulars:
(a) Dr. Winn alleges that he attempted to put the leg
in place pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by
Dr. Howe over the telephone.

If this allegation is, in fact,
- 9 -

correct, it was negligent misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to:
(i)

give verbal directions on the telephone as

to how to get the leg in place without physically examining the
same;
(ii)

put that treatment in the hands of a

pediatrician who was not trained and did not have the experience
to place an acutely dislocated knee back into place; and
(iii) fail to direct Dr. Winn to refer Mr. Avila
to an orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alternatively, to have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health
care facility which offered orthopedic services.
DAMAGES
38.

By way of damages, plaintiff complains and alleges

that, as a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence,
plaintiff suffered injuries to his person as follows:
(a)

Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased

risk of loss of the limb due to the vein graft;
(b)

Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right

leg due to probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Winn's
abortive attempt at relocating the knee;
(c)

The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to

the vein grafting;
(d)

The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a

result of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as
subcutaneous fat and other tissue; and
- 10 -

(e)

The decrease in function of both extremities due

to the vein graft and the nerve damage.
39.

In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was

otherwise damaged due to the actions of the above-referenced
health care providers in the following particulars:
(a)

Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National

Ski Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games,
as well as other national and international meets, at the time of
the accident.
is over.

As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career

Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee

had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have
been able to ski competitively;
(b)
bypass.

Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein

Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg

again, he could lose his leg;
(c)

The pain and suffering associated with undergoing

the two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984;
(d)

Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in

his leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accompanying effect on Mr. Avila1s lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer
play active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc.;
(e)

Pain and suffering associated with the infections

and recovery from the unnecessary surgery;
- 11 -

(f)

The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due

to the infection;
(g)

Numbness in the legs and feet; and

(h) Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter
Olympic Games,

Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian

National Team for the 1988 Olympics.

By simply being a member of

the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero.

Mr. Avila had

the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top
levels of that competition.

Due to his injuries, he was deprived

of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc.;
(i) Loss of prospective economic opportunity; and
(j)

Decreased earning capacity over his lifetime.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant
for special and general damages in an amount as proven at the
time of trial, together with plaintiff's costs in bringing this
action and such other relief as the Court deems just and
equitable.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 1986.
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER

GEORGE WT) H A L E ^ J 7

Attorne %/ZOT Plaintiff
P l a i n t i f f ' s Address:
P.O. Box 4241
Park City, Utah 84060
- 12 -

WILLIAM W. BARRETT (#A0229)
<N, P.C.
KiPP ANO CHRISTIAN,
ATTORNEYS TOR
6 0 0 COMMCMCIAU Ct.ua
BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH S«lll
(SOI) 321-3773

D e f e n d a n t , David Howe, M.D.
'

'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
000O000

ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT,
DAVID HOWE, M.D.

ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE;
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID
HOWE, M.D.,

Civil No. 8885

vs,

Defendants,
-000O000-

The defendant, David Howe, M.D. (Dr. Howe), answers
the Complaint of the plaintiff, Rolando Avila, and admits,
denies and alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The plaintiff's Complaint

fails to state a claim

against Dr. Howe upon which relief can be granted.

-1-

C /U U J. ^ T "

SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Dr. Howe admits that the plaintiff is a resident

of Summit County, State of Utah.
2.

Dr.

Howe

admits

that

he

is

a

physician

practicing medicine in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Dr. Howe admits that the plaintiff has served

him with a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action
pursuant to Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated; and further
admits that the plaintiff filed a request with the Department
of Business Regulation for a prelitigation screening panel.
4.

Dr. Howe admits that he had a telephone conver-

sation with defendant, Robert T. Winn, M.D., on the day plaintiff was injured.
5.

Dr.

Howe

denies

that

he

was

negligent

or

deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care with
respect to his telephone conversation with Dr. Winn or any
verbal directions he may have given him.
6.

Dr.

Howe

denies

that

he

was

negligent

in

connection with the health care services which he provided
to plaintiff or that he is otherwise liable to him.
7.

Dr. Howe denies each and every other allegation

against him contained in plaintiff's Complaint.

-2• P A N O CHRISTIAN. RC. I
ATTomnmrs AT L A W
6 0 0 COMMCnCIAU
CLUB BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY,
U T A H 8-AnI

(eoi) sai>3773

THIRD DEFENSE
The

injuries

and

damages

which

the

plaintiff

sustained were caused as a result of the negligence or other
fault of parties other than Dr. Howe.
FOURTH DEFENSE
The injuries and damages which plaintiff sustained
were caused as a result of a condition which was beyond the
control of Dr. Howe.
FIFTH DEFENSE
The plaintiff's claim must be reduced by the amounts
received by him from "collateral sources" in accordance with
the provisions of Section 78-14-4.5, Utah Code Annotated.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages.
WHEREFORE, defendant, David Howe, M.D. , prays that
the Complaint

of the plaintiff, Roland Avila, be dismissed

with prejudice and that he be awarded his costs.
DATED this

/v

day of June, 1986.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Attorney for Defendant,
Howe, M.D.

-3NO CHRISTIAN. RC. j
'OftNCYS AT LAV*
(O COMMERCIAL
I U I •UILOING
ALT LAKC O T Y ,
U T A H 8<*iti

aOl) S31-3773

David

MAILING CERTIFICATE

MAILED, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Answer of Defendant, David Howe, M.D. this
^TM

day of June, 1986, to the following:
George M. Haley
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
David R. Hamilton
Michael G. Belnap
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON
205 - 26th Street, #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiff
\

(^Mvfofflw

-4>PANO CHRISTIAN. PC.
ATTOWNCYS AT LAW
eoo COMMCWOAL
C L U « BU1LOINC
SACT LAKC CITY,
UTAH a^i 11
(•Ol) Sa»-3773

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ..^GULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
NOTICE OF
PRELITIGATION HEARING

-vsROBERT T. WINN, M.D., HOLY CROSS
FAMILY HEALTH AND EMERGENCY CENTER,
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE,
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, and
DAVID HOWE, M.D.,
Respondents

DATE OF HEARING:

DECEMBER 2, 1986

TIME:

1:00 p.m.

LOCATION:

Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
(Room assignment to be announced)

Dated this

3rd

day of

October

1986.

A^"r~^I*{
David E. Robipson
Director

Given the informal nature of the Hearing, the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated §78-14-15 as to the inadmissibility of evidence offered in any
subsequent court action, and the large number of requests for prelitigation
hearings filed with the Division, the following rules will apply:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

No request for a continuation of the Hearing will be considered
unless received by the Division within 15 days from the date of this
notice.
No more than two hours will be allocated to conduct the Hearing.
It is the responsibility of all respondents to notify their
respective insurance carriers regarding the Hearing.
If counsel is retained by the respondent(s), it is the duty of
counsel to notify the Division.
Subpoenas requested by a party must be presented to the Division
Director in proper form for his issuance before being served by the

P R O O F

OF

S E R V I C E

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing NOTICE OF
PRELIT1GATION HEARING on ail parties of record in this proceeding by mailing a
C0
Py» properly addressed, with postage prepaid to:

George M. Haley
Attorney at Law
HALEY & STOLKBARGER
Tenth Floor Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956
David W. Slagle
Attorney at Law
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
William W. Barrett
Attorney at Law
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David H. Epperson
Attorney at Law
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
176 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd day of October, 1986

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing

Gwen B. Rowley
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County,
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90

lah

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Hebcr M, Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
PANEL OPINION

-vsHOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
Respondent

Appearances:
George M. HaleyDavid W. Slagle

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
l ^

NON-MERITORIOUS

(3) -Qst^1 g*- .did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
Dated this

2nd

day of

December

, 1986

^w^c^y x L . i ^ ^ ^ K -

ot- c^i'
/

•

/

•

/

'

P R O O F

0 F

S E R V I C E

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing PANEL OPINIONS and
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE on all parties of record in this proceeding by mailing
a copy, properly addressed, with postage prepaid to:

George M. Haley
Attorney at Law
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956
David W. Siagie
Attorney at Law
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
William W. Barrett
Attorney at Law
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David H. Epperson
Attorney at Law
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
176 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 8th day of December, 1986.

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing

iA^

Gwen B^ Rowley
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90

David H. Epperson, #1000
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant Dr. Winn
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D.,

Civil No:

8885

Defendants.
COMES NOW the defendant, Robert T. Winn, M.D., and pursuant
to §78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated (1979), and §78-14-12, Utah Code
Annotated (1987), moves the Court for an Order of Dismissal.
DATED this

//

day of November, 1987.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

DAVID H. EPPERSC
Attorney for Defendant Dr. Winn

MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this

\J-

day of November, 1987/ to:
David R. Hamilton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
205 - 26th Street, #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
George M. Haley, Esq.
Attorney for Plantiff
Tenth Floor Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David W. Slagle, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Holy Cross
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
William W. Barrett, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Howe
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DAVID W. SLAGLE
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Holy Cross Family Health
and Emergency Center, Holy
Cross Hospital Park City
Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hospital
Eleventh Floor, Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
P. O.Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D.,

MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH
AND EMERGENCY CENTER,
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK
CITY AMBULANCE, AND HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL
No. 8885

Defendants

Defendants, Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center,
Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hospital, hereby move the Court for an Order of Dismissal
pursuant to §78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN. (1979), and §78-14-12,
UTAH CODE ANN. (1987).

DATED this

T

day of November, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

By

& MARTINEAU

L ^

" David W. Sic
Attorneys for Defendants
Holy Cross Family Health
and Emergency Center, Holy
Cross Hospital Park City
Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hospital

-2-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
/

SS

'

REBECCA BOOTEE, being duly swcrr., csyr th?t s:\-~ is
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for
defendants Holy Cross
herein; that
she served the attached Motion to Dismiss as to defendants Holy Cross
___
(Case No.
8885
) upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
enveloce addressed to:
David R. Hamilton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
205 - 26th Street, #34
Ogden, Utah84 4 01
George M. Haley, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David H. Epperson, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Winn
Suite 650,
17 5 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
William W. Barrett, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Howe
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 4th
day of
November
, 1987.

REBECCA BOOTEE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
of

MovombQg

' 1987.

4th

day
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DAVID W. SLAGL E
SHOW, CHRJSTENSEN & M&RTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Pes- Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 3 4145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendant
Holy Cross Family Health
and Emergency Can-car, Holy
Cross Hospicai Park Cicy
Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hoscitai

i:i THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE CF UTAH
ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,

i

ORDER

vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE; ]
EOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID
]
EOWE, M.D.,
]

Civil No.

990?
W w w «•»

Defendants.

Defendant Holy Cross Hospital's Motion to Dismiss came on
regularly for hearing and decision,, pursuant to Notice, before
the above-entitled Court on March 7, 1988. George M. Haley
appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Elizabeth King Brennan
appeared on behalf of defendant Holy Cross Hospital.

The Court, being fully advised on the premises, having
reviewed the pleadings and heard oral argument, hereby orders
as follows:
!•

The legislative intent behind recuirinc craiiticati

panel review before medical malpractice actions may be filed
has not been accorded ios due; consequently, proceedings rel£
vano to this acoion are herebv toiled oendinc full creli~icao
panel review.
2.

Subsequent to the decision rendered by the panel,

DATED this

day of March, 193 8
BY THE COUR']

Par 3- B r i a n , Distr-irct Judge

-

2

-

DEPARTMENT OF BUSlNfcSS REGULATION
Heber ft. Walls Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone; f80i; 530-6628
8EF0RL THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA

Case No. PR-36-03-007
Petitioner,

—vs-

AFFIDAVIT OF
COMPLIANCE

R08ERT T. WINN, M.O. , HOLY CROSS
:
FAMILY HEALTH AND EMERGENCY CENTER,
:
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE,:
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, DAVID HOWE, M.D.
:
Respondents,
:

I* Dav/id E. Robinson, Director, Division of Occupational £ Professional
Licensing, Deoartment of Business Regulation, hereby certify that a]1
requirements set forth in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have
been satisfied regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter.

Dated this

12th

day of July, 1988.

Dav/xd E.
Director

S T A T E

RobinVon

SEAL

,/0
'vTlA.lfv.l

W \

"

sap / f
DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants
Holy Cross Family Health
and Emergency Center, Holy
Cross Hospital Park City
Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hospital

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE;
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID
HOWE, M.D.,

Civil No. 8885
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4Kb) and
SS 78-14-4 and 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the
defendant Holy Cross Hospital moves the Court for an Order
dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.
the following:

r* ... u.i- ^ \) h

The Motion is based on

1.

Despite timely notice to appear or appoint other

counsel, plaintiff has failed to prosecute his claim;
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint filed May 23, 1986 is

technically deficient for failing to comply with mandatory
statutory prerequisites.
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Statement of
Points and Authorities.
DATED this Ifcl" day of September, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

% ^ ^

By

Elizabeth King Brennan
Attorneys for Defendant
Holy Cross Hospital
SCMEKB197
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

PEGGY HERRING, being duly sworn, deposes and says that she
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendant Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency
Center, Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance and Holy Cross
Hospital herein; that she served the attached MOTION TO
DISMISS
(Case No. 8885, Summit
County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and
correct copy in an envelope addressed to:
David H. Epperson
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Rolando Avila
Post Office Box 1761
Park City, Utah 84060
William W. Barrett
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on this

16th day of

September

, 1988.

PEGGY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 16th day of
September - '

t 1988.

My Commission Expires:

l-M-90

NOTAR^ PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah

GEORGE M. HALEY (1302)
STEVEN P. ROWE (4656)
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/531-1555
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

(

ROLANDO AVILA,
Plaintiff,

WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

v.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D., et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 8885

George M. Haley and Steven P. Rowe of the office of Haley &
Stolebarger, pursuant to Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the
District and Circuit Courts, hereby withdraw as counsel of record
for the Plaintiff, Rolando Avila, in the above-entitled action.
Such withdrawal will not result in a delay of trial and no trial
date has been set.
DATED this £tt

day of August, 1988.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

STEVEN P. ROWE

cpy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the O? 7 day of August, 1988, true and
correct copies of the foregoing "Withdrawal of Counsel" were
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Daivd W. Slagle
10 Exchange Place
Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

William W. Barrett
Kipp & Christian
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

David H. Epperson
175 S. West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Rolando Avila
Post Office Bex 1761
Park City, UT 84060

^Li.^

DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants
Holy Cross Family Health
and Emergency Center, Holy
Cross Hospital Park City
Ambulance, and Holy Cross
Hospital

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROLANDO AVILA,
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE;
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID
HOWE, M.D.,

Civil No. 8885
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Defendant Holy Cross Hospital submits the following
Statement in support of its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
2.8, Rules of Practice in the District Courts for the State of
Utah.

.(^

.,

, . L ^ flA '

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

This claim involves an allegation of medical

malpractice against the defendants for treatment rendered to
Rolando Avila on or about February 1, 1984.
2.

A Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Litigation

was filed on or about January 31, 1986 as required by § 78-14-8,
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
3.

On March 4, 1986, plaintiff filed a Request for Panel

Review as required by § 78-14-12(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).
4.

Pursuant to § 78-14-11(1) of the Utah Code Ann. (1953,

as amended) a prelitigation screening panel hearing is required
as a compulsory condition precedent before a plaintiff may file
a Complaint.
5.

On or about June 30, 1986, the parties stipulated

prelitigation review would be extended for successive 30-day
periods until the Department of Business Regulations scheduled
the hearing.

This Stipulation, prepared by plaintiff's

counsel, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
6.

Before such a hearing was scheduled, plaintiff filed a

Complaint on or about May 23, 1986.
7.

Not until after the Complaint was filed was a preliti-

gation panel hearing held, on December 2, 1986. During this
hearing, plaintiff did not bother to put on any evidence to
support his allegations.

-2-

8.

Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss was heard on

March 7, 1988. After oral argument, the Court ruled the case
should be sent back for full prelitigation panel review.

The

Court's Order is attached as Exhibit "B."
9.

A second prelitigation panel hearing was held on

July 6, 1988. The Department of Business Regulations issued an
Affidavit of Compliance on July 12, 1988; such Affidavit was
accompanied with a 3-page "Opinion of the Panel."

The Panel's

findings as well as the Opinion are attached as Exhibit "C."
10.

On August 23, 1988, plaintiff's counsel of record

withdrew.
11.

On August 25, 1988, plaintiff was given 30 days to

appoint other counsel or to appear in person.

No response was

generated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

f

Q 0

*<*/*

'

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b),
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
It is undisputed that in order to handle the business of
the court with efficiency and expedition, the trial court has a
reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to
prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to the
rules and directions of the court, without justifiable excuse.

-3-

Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1975).

Whether there is such

justifiable excuse is determined by several factors:

(1) the

length of time since the suit was filed; (2) the opportunity
both parties have had to move the case forward; (3) degree of
difficulty or prejudice caused to the other side; and (4)
whether injustice may result from the dismissal.

Id- at 879.

In the interest of expediency and efficiency, several
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court have held that dismissal
for failure to prosecute is not an abuse of discretion.
Grundman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (1984); Pitman v.
Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (1984); K.L.C., Inc. v. Lambert, 613 P.2d
765 (1980); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975); and
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 508 P.2d 528 (1973).
In the present case, plaintiffs have failed to timely
submit notice of appearance as required by Rule 2.5 of the
Rules of Practice for the District Courts of the State of
Utah.

Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's claims should be involuntarily
dismissed for failure to prosecute.

-4-

IN THE ALTE^ATtVEV^IAfTSTTXPr'S COMPLAINT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FQEHF'MLING TO TIMELY
OBTAIN A PRELITI&ATTdN HEARING WHICH IS A
COMPULSORY CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FILING A
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT.
The statutory language of Utah's Health Care Malpractice
Act establishes jurisdictional requirements that must be
fulfilled before a court will recognize the claimant's action.
The party initiating a medical malpractice action
shall file a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review
with the Department of Business Regulation within 60
days after the filing of a Statutory Notice of Intent
to Commence Action under Section 78-14-8.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
Further, the Utah legislature has specifically stated the
consequence of noncompliance with the Health Care Malpractice
Act:

The Complaint cannot be filed.

The [prelitigation panel] proceedings are informal and
non-binding, but are compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
The language of the statute is unequivocal.

The timing and

sequence of events does matter; the prelitigation screening
must occur before a Complaint can be filed. As the Utah
Supreme Court noted:
There are numerous instances in which the law requires
fulfillment of a condition precedent before the filing
of a complaint, a failure to comply with the condition
may result in a dismissal.

-5-

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), citing
Costello v. United States, 635 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 532, 5
L.Ed.2d 551 (1961).
The Court in Foil then upheld the statutory requirement of
filing a Notice of Intent and affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to comply with the statutory
prerequisites.

See also, Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center,

617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah
1978).
The statutory purpose and mandate is clear:

A plaintiff

cannot initiate a claim against a health care provider without
first complying with the statutory requirement of a prelitigation panel hearing.

Without such a prior hearing, plaintiff's

case must be dismissed.

A contrary ruling would be in opposi-

tion to the legislature's stated purpose, that of reducing the
number of meritless medical malpractice actions by forcing
early appraisal and review.
CONCLUSION
This Court should defer to the case law and to the Utah
legislature's judgment by refusing to recognize plaintiff's
claim based on his failure to prosecute and his failure to
timely undergo prelitigation panel review.

-6-

DATED this |5™ day of September, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By ftit/Mfo* &ht'fr^v^
Elizabeth King^Brennan
Attorneys for Defendant
Holy Cross Hospital

SCMEKB198
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

PEGGY HERRING, being duly sworn, deposes and says that she
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendant Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency
Center, Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance and Holy Cross
Hospital herein; that she served the attached STATEMENT OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT's MOTTOM T O
DISMISS
(Case No. 8885, Summit
County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and
correct copy in an envelope addressed to:
Rolando Avila
Post Office Box 1761
Park City, Utah 84060

David H. Epperson
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

William W. Barrett
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on this 16th day of September
, 1988 •

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 16th
September, 1988.

My Commission Expires:

UL

day of

CVVL

NOTARY) PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah

1

that you were going to come in here today with a lawyer,

2

or state unequivocally that you were going to have no

3

lawyer,
MR. AVILLA:

It's such a complicated matter,

4
how could I get a lawyer to review files this big and —
5
THE COURT:
6

I'll tell you that lawyers

become quick studies on these things.

7

MR. AVILLA:

8 II

THE COURT:

I'm sure, but —
Two weeks is more than adequate

9 I) time.
MR. AVILLA:

10

The motion in dismissal is

already been overruled, so I don't feel that I have any -11
THE COURT:

Do you want to have a hearing

12
today, Ms. Brennen, on your pending motion to dismiss,
13

or do you merely want me to schedule everything.

14
15

MR. EPPERSON:

May I address that briefly.

Your Honor, a notice of intent to commence a malpractice

16 II action was filed in January of 1986.

We are obviously

17 (I now in October of 1988, and Mr. Avilla and his counsel
18

—

previous counsel, that is —

had ample opportunity

over several years to explore the facts in this case.
19
This is an unusual case in that we had two
20
prelitigation panel reviews.
21

The initial one was held,

that was concluded, and really in leniency to the plaintiff,

22

Judge Brian felt that it might be helpful to have a second

23

prelitigation hearing, which was done before a medical

24

panel.

25

I know the results of that are not significant to this

A three page written opinion was issued, and

CLAIR

JOHNSON

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH

prelitigation panel/ you can agree to extend for thirty
day periods the time for that to come up.
And that's what was done by the exhibit in
front of you.
THE COURT:

Then what you are saying is

that what the stipulation does is that even though the
stipulation was entered into after the initiation of
the lawsuit, that the stipulation would have allowed
them to technically file a new lawsuit without going
outside the statute of limitations after the prelitigation
hearing was scheduled.
MS. BRENNEN:

That's right.

MR. EPPERSON:

My understanding of the

stipulation was that any defect that preexisted that
stipulation was not waived.
In other words, if a Complaint was filed before
the prelitigation hearing request/ which is a condition
precedent/ we were not waiving that as a defect.
My understanding was that we felt it beneficial
to have the prelitigation hearing/ and the intent of
the additional stipulated time would be waived as far
as that potential defect goes only.
THE COURT:

But the defect you're waiving

in this motion could have been overcome by timely filing
a new lawsuit.
MR. EPPERSON:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

After the December scheduled

hearing?
CLAIR JOHNSON
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

1

MR. EPPERSON:

That's correct.

The panel

opinions have sixty days after issuance during which
time the statute is tolled, and in which time a new -within the sixty days a new Complaint should be filed
if you are trying to rely upon the statute of limitations
as having been tolled during the waiting period of the
prelitigation hearing.
THE COURT:
my inquiry is this:

A H right.

The reason for

Is that I don't think it's appropriate

that someone's lawsuit should be dismissed and then they
be required to file a new one, which obviously is going
to be outside the statute of limitations, if the reason
for the problem is caused by the delay in the Department
of Business Regulations.
It's just not fair, and I don't know how you
get around the statute, but I guess you figure out a
way.

But I take it from what I hear is that that is

not the case, there was a full right to file a new lawsuit
-- technically a new lawsuit after the December hearing
because of the stipulation that you have shown to me
and which is part of my file.
MS. BENNEN:

That's accurate.

MR. EPPERSON:

Yes. I would say yes,

that did not waive the defect in filing the original
Complaint before meeting the conditions precedent.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Avilla, I think it's appropriate that the
case should be dismissed.

I have satisfied myself from
CLAIR JOHNSON

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

15

